

*Lectures on
General Equilibrium Theory
Michaelmas 2008*

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Readings on General Equilibrium Theory

The most relevant book for these lectures is Hal Varian's *Microeconomic Analysis* (chapters 17, 18, and 21). This book is an advanced version of his *Intermediate Microeconomics*, which most of you are familiar with.

When we get to the material on incomplete markets, you should also read Chapter 8 in Timothy van Zandt's draft book, *Introduction to the Economics of Uncertainty and Information*. You can find it at

<http://faculty.insead.edu/vanzandt/327files/mybook.html>

The treatment given in *Microeconomic Theory* (chapters 15, 16, 17, and 19) by Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, is more comprehensive and thus useful, but it is also more demanding.

Notation

The set

$$R^l = \{x = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_l) : x_i \in R\}$$

is known as the **Euclidean space**. We denote

$$R_+^l = \{x \in R^l : x_i \geq 0 \forall i\}$$

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Finally, $x \gg y$ if $x_i > y_i$ for all i .

Examples: $(1, 3, 3) > (1, 2, 3)$ and $(1, 3, 3) \gg (0, 2, 1)$.

Demand Theory

Assume that there are l commodities and that the consumption space is R_+^l (the positive orthant).

Agent has the utility function $U : R_+^l \rightarrow R$.

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At price (vector) $p = (p_1, p_2, \dots, p_l)$ in R_{++}^l (we also write $p \gg 0$) and income $w > 0$, the **budget set** is

$$B(p, w) = \{x \in R_+^l : p \cdot x \leq w\}.$$

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A commodity bundle x^* is the **demand** of the agent at (p, w) if x^* maximizes utility in $B(p, w)$; formally,

$$x^* \in \operatorname{argmax}_{x \in B(p, w)} U(x).$$

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What condition on U is sufficient to guarantee that x^* exists?

Answer: (P1) When U is a continuous function.

Demand Theory

A set K in R^l is said to be **bounded** if there is $B > 0$ such that for any x in K , $|x_i| < B$.

K is said to be **closed** if whenever the sequence x^n is in K and x^n converges to \bar{x} , then \bar{x} is also in K .

Loosely speaking, a closed set is one that contains its boundary.

Any set that is closed and bounded is said to be **compact**.

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Weierstrass Theorem: Suppose that K is a compact set in R^l and $F : K \rightarrow R$ a continuous function. Then

$$\operatorname{argmax}_{x \in K} F(x) \neq \emptyset.$$

Demand Theory

Proposition: Suppose $U : R_+^l \rightarrow R$ is a continuous function. Then for any $p \gg 0$ and $w > 0$, the demand set $\operatorname{argmax}_{x \in B(p,w)} U(x)$ is nonempty.

Proof: The budget set $B(p, w)$ is a compact set. So result follows immediately from Weierstrass Theorem.

QED

Demand Theory

Question: Suppose $x^* \in \operatorname{argmax}_{x \in B(p,w)} U(x)$.

When does x^* obey the **budget identity**, i.e., $p \cdot x^* = w$?

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Answer: (P2) When U is **strictly monotone**, i.e., whenever $x'' > x'$, we have $U(x'') > U(x')$.

Proof: Suppose, to the contrary, that $p \cdot x^* < w$. Then there is $\epsilon > 0$ and sufficiently small such that $x^{**} = x^* + (\epsilon, \epsilon, \dots, \epsilon)$ is in $B(p, w)$, i.e., $p \cdot x^{**} = p \cdot x^* + p \cdot (\epsilon, \epsilon, \dots, \epsilon) < w$.

By monotonicity, $U(x^{**}) > U(x^*)$ - contradiction.

QED

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Answer: (P3) When U is **strictly quasi-concave**, i.e.,
if $x' \neq x''$ and $U(x') = U(x'')$, then for any $\lambda \in (0, 1)$

$$U(\lambda x' + (1 - \lambda)x'') > U(x') = U(x'').$$

Proof: Suppose to the contrary that x^* and x^{**} are both in $\operatorname{argmax}_{x \in B(p,w)} U(x)$. Then $U(x^*) = U(x^{**})$.

The bundle $x' = 0.5x^* + 0.5x^{**}$ is also in $B(p, w)$ (since $p \cdot x' \leq w$) and has a higher utility than x^* (or x^{**}). **QED**

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Note: A sufficient condition for U to be strictly quasi-concave is for it be **strictly concave**, i.e., for $x' \neq x''$ and t in $(0, 1)$, we have

$$U(tx' + (1 - t)x'') > tU(x') + (1 - t)U(x'').$$

Check this yourself; check also that quasi-concavity (but not concavity) is an ordinal property.

Demand Theory

To recap: if U obeys (P1) and (P3), then for any (p, w) in $R_{++}^l \times R_{++}$, there exists a *unique* element x^* in $\operatorname{argmax}_{x \in B(p, w)} U(x)$.

So we can define a function $\bar{x} : R_{++}^l \times R_{++} \rightarrow R_+^l$ mapping

(p, w) to $\bar{x}(p, w) = \operatorname{argmax}_{x \in B(p, w)} U(x)$.

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(P1) also guarantees that \bar{x} is a *continuous* function.

Furthermore, if U obeys (P2) then \bar{x} obeys the budget identity, i.e., $p \cdot \bar{x}(p, w) = w$.

Demand Theory

Example: The **Cobb-Douglas** utility function

$$U(x) = \sum_{i=1}^l \alpha_i \ln x_i,$$

with $\sum_i^l \alpha_i = 1$. This satisfies (P1), (P2), and (P3) because the natural log function is continuous, increasing, and strictly concave (so, in fact, U is strictly concave).

The demand function generated by U is

$$\bar{x}(p, w) = \left(\alpha_1 \frac{w}{p_1}, \alpha_2 \frac{w}{p_2}, \dots, \alpha_l \frac{w}{p_l} \right).$$

Note that the share of expenditure on good i is always α_i ; in other words, when income is w , the agent always spends $\alpha_i w$ on good i , irrespective of the prices.

Exchange Economy

Assume that there is a finite set A of agents.

Agent $a \in A$ has the utility function $U^a : R_+^l \rightarrow R$ and endowment $\omega^a = (\omega_1^a, \omega_2^a, \dots, \omega_l^a)$ in R_+^l .

We require U^a to obey (P1), (P2), and (P3), and that **aggregate endowment**

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which in turn guarantees that $z^a(\lambda p) = z^a(p)$.

Since $p \cdot \bar{x}^a(p, p \cdot \omega^a) = p \cdot \omega^a$, we have

$$p \cdot [\bar{x}^a(p, p \cdot \omega^a) - \omega^a] = 0.$$

So $p \cdot z^a(p) = 0$.

QED

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Aggregate (or market) demand at price p is

$$X(p) = \sum_{a \in A} \hat{x}^a(p).$$

Aggregate excess demand function $Z : R_{++}^l \rightarrow R^l$ is

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Fundamental Question: What conditions guarantee that there is $p^* \gg 0$ such that $Z(p^*) = 0$?

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Fundamental Question: What conditions guarantee that there is $p^* \gg 0$ such that $Z(p^*) = 0$?

Note that, since Z is zero-homogeneous, if p^* is an equilibrium price so is λp^* for any $\lambda > 0$.

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With two agents A and B and two goods:

Agent A's utility function $U^A(x_1, x_2) = \ln x_1 + 2 \ln x_2$.

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Endowment $\omega^A = (1, 0)$, so $w^A = p_1$, and

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$$\hat{x}^A(p) = \left(\frac{1}{3}, \frac{2p_1}{3p_2} \right).$$

Assume that agent B's utility function is $U^B(x_1, x_2) = 2 \ln x_1 + \ln x_2$ and that his endowment is $(0, 1)$.

Exchange Economy

Exercise: show that

$$Z(p) = \left(-\frac{2}{3} + \frac{2p_2}{3p_1}, \frac{2p_1}{3p_2} - \frac{2}{3} \right).$$

Setting $Z_1(p) = 0$ we obtain $p_1 = p_2$.

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Note: if at p^* , we have $Z_1(p^*) = 0$ then $Z_2(p^*) = 0$. This follows from Walras' Law, which says that $p_1^* Z_1(p^*) + p_2^* Z_2(p^*) = 0$.

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
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Clear from picture that the existence of a solution to $Z(p) = 0$ requires the **continuity** of Z and also the right **boundary condition** ...

Continuity of Z is guaranteed if \bar{x}^a is continuous for all a . This is in turn guaranteed by (P1) (the continuity of U^a for all agents a).

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Turning to the boundary conditions...

Proposition: Suppose U^a obeys (P1), (P2), and (P3). Let the sequence $(p^n, w^n) \rightarrow (\bar{p}, \bar{w})$ such that $\bar{w} > 0$ and the set $I = \{i : \bar{p}_i = 0\}$ is nonempty. Then $\sum_{i \in I} \bar{x}_i^a(p^n, w^n) \rightarrow \infty$.

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Proposition: Suppose U^a obeys (P1), (P2), and (P3). Let the sequence $(p^n, w^n) \rightarrow (\bar{p}, \bar{w})$ such that $\bar{w} > 0$ and the set $I = \{i : \bar{p}_i = 0\}$ is nonempty. Then $\sum_{i \in I} \bar{x}_i^a(p^n, w^n) \rightarrow \infty$.

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Exchange Economy

Clear from picture that the existence of a solution to $Z(p) = 0$ requires the **continuity** of Z and also the right **boundary condition** ...

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The requirement that $\bar{w} > 0$ is crucial. Compare $p^n = (1, \frac{1}{n})$ with $\omega = (1, 0)$ and $\omega = (0, 1)$; w^n tends to 1 in the first case and 0 in the second...

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Corollary: In economy \mathcal{E} , suppose p^n tends to $\bar{p} \neq 0$, such that $I = \{i : \bar{p}_i = 0\}$ is nonempty. Then $\sum_{i \in I} Z_i(p^n) \rightarrow \infty$.

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Proof: Suppose that for good k , $\bar{p}_k > 0$. Since $\bar{\omega} = \sum_{a \in A} \omega^a \gg 0$, there is \tilde{a} with $\omega_k^{\tilde{a}} > 0$. (In other words, there is some agent \tilde{a} who has a strictly positive endowment of good k .) Then $p^n \cdot \omega^{\tilde{a}}$ tends to $\bar{w}^{\tilde{a}} = \bar{p} \cdot \omega^{\tilde{a}} > 0$.

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So $\sum_{i \in I} \hat{x}_i^{\tilde{a}}(p^n) = \sum_{i \in I} \bar{x}_i^{\tilde{a}}(p^n, p^n \cdot \omega^{\tilde{a}}) \rightarrow \infty$, which implies that

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Exercise: In the example, let $p^n = (1, 1/n)$. Show that $x_2^A(p^n)$ tends to infinity and that $Z_2(p^n)$ tends to infinity. Show also that $x_2^B(p^n)$ does not tend to infinity; why?

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Theorem (Arrow and Debreu; McKenzie): Suppose Z satisfies properties (1) to (5). Then there is p^* such that $Z(p^*) = 0$.

Proof uses Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem.

Exchange Economy

When the economy has just two goods, existence can be proved using the intermediate value theorem.

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So there is p' and p'' such that $Z_2(1, p') > 0$ and $Z_2(1, p'') < 0$. By IVT, there is p^* such that $Z_2(1, p^*) = 0$. **QED**