

# Revealed Price Preference: Theory and Stochastic Testing

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Bounded Rationality in Choice

London, July 2017

## Introduction: Revealed preference – the familiar theory

We observe a consumer's demand over some set of  $L$  goods.  
At observation  $t$ , the prevailing prices are

$$p^t = (p_1^t, p_2^t, \dots, p_L^t) \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^L$$

and the consumer purchases the bundle

$$x^t = (x_1^t, x_2^t, \dots, x_L^t) \in \mathbb{R}_+^L.$$

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Formally, we have access to a data set  $\mathcal{D} := \{(p^t, x^t)\}_{t=1}^T$ .

We say the consumer *revealed weakly prefers* (*strictly prefers*) the bundle  $x^t$  to the bundle  $x^{t'}$ , with notation  $x^t \succeq_x$  ( $\succ_x$ )  $x^{t'}$ , if

$$p^t x^t \geq (>) p^t x^{t'}.$$

$\mathcal{D}$  satisfies the **generalized axiom of revealed preference** (GARP) if  $\succeq_x$  has no cycles containing  $\succ_x$ .

## Introduction: Revealed preference – the familiar theory

**Definition:** A utility function  $\tilde{U} : \mathbb{R}_+^L \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  rationalizes  $\mathcal{D} = \{(p^t, x^t)\}_{t=1}^T$  if, for all  $t = 1, 2, \dots, T$ ,

$$x^t \in \operatorname{argmax}\{\tilde{U}(x) : p^t x \leq p^t x^t\}.$$

**Afriat's Theorem:** Given a data set  $\mathcal{D} = \{(p^t, x^t)\}_{t=1}^T$ , the following are equivalent:

1.  $\mathcal{D}$  can be rationalized by a locally nonsatiated preference
2.  $\mathcal{D}$  satisfies GARP.
3.  $\mathcal{D}$  can be rationalized by a strictly increasing, continuous, and concave utility function.

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Limitations of this approach:

Typically, we only observe the consumer's demand over a fraction of all goods.

Expenditure on the  $L$  observed goods is *endogenous* (contrary to standard textbook presentations of consumer demand).

Utility is defined over *all* goods and not just the  $L$  goods observed.

Therefore, empirical work requires a utility function of the form

$$V(U(x), y_1, y_2, y_3, \dots)$$

where there is a subutility  $U(x)$  over  $L$  goods, which is 'detachable' (and thus definable) from all other goods.

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where there is a subutility  $U(x)$  over  $L$  goods, which is 'detachable' (and thus definable) from all other goods.

Lastly, this model does not tell us whether a subject is better under one set of prices (on the  $L$  goods) versus another set of prices.

In fact, scalar multiples of prices are indistinguishable in this model.

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$$p^t x^{t'} \leq (<) p^{t'} x^{t'}.$$

We use the notation  $p^t \succeq_p (>_p) p^{t'}$ .

Motivation:

At price vector  $p^t$ , the consumer can buy the bundle bought at observation  $t'$  and it will cost him less.

So he must prefer the price  $p^t$  to the price  $p^{t'}$ .



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What optimizing model is observationally equivalent to GAPP?

## Expenditure-Augmented Utility

Suppose that a consumer's purchasing behavior over  $L$  goods is guided by (1) benefit he derives from the  $L$  goods and (2) disutility of the expenditure incurred from spending money on those goods.

The consumer has an **expenditure-augmented utility function** (or simply, an augmented utility function)  $U : \mathbb{R}_+^L \times \mathbb{R}_- \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ .

If consuming bundle  $x$  incurs expenditure  $e$ , then the utility is  $U(x, -e)$ .

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Note: This model generalizes the quasilinear utility model where  $x$  is chosen to maximize  $V(x) - px$ .

## Rationalization

**Definition:** A expenditure-augmented utility function

$$U : \mathbb{R}_+^L \times \mathbb{R}_- \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$$

rationalizes  $\mathcal{D} = \{(p^t, x^t)\}_{t=1}^T$  if, for all  $t = 1, 2, \dots, T$ ,

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## GAPP is also Sufficient for Rationalization

**Theorem 1:** Given a data set  $\mathcal{D} = \{(p^t, x^t)\}_{t=1}^T$ , the following are equivalent:

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3.  $\mathcal{D}$  can be rationalized by an augmented utility function  $U$  that is strictly increasing, continuous, and concave.

Moreover,  $U$  is such that  $\max_{x \in \mathbb{R}_+^L} U(x, -p \cdot x)$  has a solution for all  $p \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^L$ .

## Necessity of GAPP

The **indirect utility** at price  $p$  (corresponding to  $U$ ) is

$$V(p) := \max_{x \in \mathbb{R}_+^L} U(x, -px). \quad (1)$$

The consumer *revealed weakly prefers* (strictly prefers)  $p^t$  to  $p^{t'}$

[notation  $p^t \succeq_p (\succ_p) p^{t'}$ ] if  $p^t x^{t'} \leq (<) p^{t'} x^{t'}$ .

If consumer is maximizing  $U(x, -px)$ , then  $p^t \succeq_p (\succ_p) p^{t'} \implies$

$$V(p^t) \geq U(x^{t'}, -p^t x^{t'}) \geq (>) U(x^{t'}, -p^{t'} x^{t'}) = V(p^{t'}).$$

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Suppose there are observations  $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_n$  such that

$$p^{t_1} \succeq_p p^{t_2}, p^{t_2} \succeq_p p^{t_3}, \dots, p^{t_{n-1}} \succeq_p p^{t_n}, \text{ and } p^{t_n} \succeq_p p^{t_1}$$

Then we obtain  $V(p^{t_1}) \geq V(p^{t_2}) \geq \dots V(p^{t_n}) \geq V(p^{t_1})$ , which means we cannot replace  $\succeq_p$  with  $\succ_p$  anywhere in the cycle.

## Features of the revealed price preference model

It does not require the assumption of separability of observed goods, i.e., does not require  $V(U(x), y_1, y_2, \dots)$ .


But it does require that outside prices are constant or at least that their changes can be tracked by a composite price index of non-observed goods.

It allows for consistent welfare comparisons between price vectors. (Indeed, the whole theory is built on this consistency.)

It is readily generalized to a *realistic* random utility framework (unlike the standard model).

## Data Satisfies GARP but not GAPP

The data set with  $p^t = (2, 1)$ ,  $x^t = (4, 0)$  and  $p^{t'} = (1, 2)$ ,  $x^{t'} = (0, 1)$  satisfies GARP.



But notice that  $p^t x^t = 8 > p^{t'} x^t = 4$ , so  $p^{t'} \succ_p p^t$ , and  $p^{t'} x^{t'} = 2 > p^t x^{t'} = 1$ , so  $p^t \succ_p p^{t'}$ . Data fails GAPP.

## Testing GAPP vs. GARP

**Scaling Proposition:** Let  $\mathcal{D} = \{(p^t, x^t)\}_{t=1}^T$  be a data set and let  $\tilde{\mathcal{D}} = \{(p^t, \tilde{x}^t)\}_{t \in T}$ , where  $\tilde{x}^t = x^t / (p^t x^t)$ , be its expenditure-normalized version.

Then the revealed preference relations are related as follows:

1.  $p^t \succeq_p p^{t'}$  if and only if  $\tilde{x}^t \succeq_x \tilde{x}^{t'}$ .
2.  $p^t \succ_p p^{t'}$  if and only if  $\tilde{x}^t \succ_x \tilde{x}^{t'}$ .

Proof:  $p^t \frac{x^t}{p^t x^t} \geq p^{t'} \frac{x^{t'}}{p^{t'} x^{t'}}$  iff  $p^{t'} x^{t'} \geq p^t x^t$ . □

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This implies that testing GAPP on  $\mathcal{D}$  is equivalent to scaling the consumption bundles and testing GARP on  $\tilde{\mathcal{D}}$ .




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


## Data Satisfies GARP but not GAPP

Scaling bundles, it is clear that

$$p^t = (2, 1), x^t = (4, 0) \text{ and } p^{t'} = (1, 2), x^{t'} = (0, 1)$$

violates GAPP. Scaled bundles:  $\tilde{x}^t = (4, 0)$ .  $\tilde{x}^{t'} = (0, 4)$ .



## Welfare Analysis

Rationalizable data  $\mathcal{D}$  could potentially be rationalized by many  $U$ 's leading to different indirect utilities  $V$ 's.

Notation:

- ▶  $\mathbf{V}(\mathcal{D})$ : set of rationalizing indirect utility functions.
- ▶  $\succsim_p^*$  ( $\succ_p^*$ ): transitive closure of  $\succsim_p$  (with one relation strict).

**Welfare Proposition:** Suppose  $\mathcal{D} = \{(p^t, x^t)\}_{t=1}^T$  is rationalizable by an augmented utility function. Then for any  $p^t, p^{t'}$ :

1.  $p^t \succsim_p^* p^{t'}$  if and only if  $V(p^t) \geq V(p^{t'})$  for all  $V \in \mathbf{V}(\mathcal{D})$ .
2.  $p^t \succ_p^* p^{t'}$  if and only if  $V(p^t) > V(p^{t'})$  for all  $V \in \mathbf{V}(\mathcal{D})$ .

Thus,  $\succsim_p$  allows for welfare comparisons under different prices.

## Random utility in the standard model (McFadden-Richter)

In this case, an observation  $t$  consists of a distribution of demand bundles at price  $p^t$  and income  $w^t$ .

With a finite set of such distributions, how do we check whether the observed distributions can be generated by a population of utility-maximizing consumers, with this requirement:

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
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
McFadden and Richter's crucial observation:

the number of observationally distinguishable utility-types is *finite*, so this problem is equivalent to solving an appropriate linear program.


# Stochastic GARP




(a) Prop. of this Preference =  $\nu_1$



(b) Prop. of this Preference =  $\nu_2$




(c) Prop. of this Preference =  $\nu_3$




(d) Choice Distribution

# Stochastic GARP



(a) Rationalizable Shares



(b) Observed Distribution

The observed distribution of choices can be stochastically rationalized if there exist  $\nu_1, \nu_2, \nu_3 \geq 0$  such that

$$\nu_1 + \nu_2 = \pi^{1,t}, \quad \nu_2 = \pi^{1,t'}, \quad \nu_3 = \pi^{2,t}, \quad \nu_1 + \nu_3 = \pi^{2,t'}$$

## Limitations of the McFadden-Richter model

The problem with the McFadden-Richter model is that data of the type imagined is not actually observed.

Expenditure levels are not exogenously prescribed but *endogenously determined* by the population of consumers.



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The data set is  $\mathcal{D} := \{(p^t, \tilde{\pi}^t)\}_{t=1}^T$ . At observation  $t$ ,

$\tilde{\pi}^t$  is the distribution of demand bundles on  $\mathbb{R}_+^L$  —

these bundles *need not* generate the same expenditure at  $p^t$ .

A model of choice that rationalizes  $\mathcal{D}$  must also explain the observed distribution of expenditure levels.

## Rationalization by Random Augmented Utility

Let  $\mathcal{D} := \{(p^t, \tilde{\pi}^t)\}_{t=1}^T$ .

$\mathcal{D}$  is said to be **rationalized by the random augmented utility model** if there exists a distribution  $\mu$  over the set  $\mathcal{U}$  of augmented utility functions such that

$$\tilde{\pi}^t(X^t) = \mu(\mathcal{U}(X^t)) \text{ for all } t \in T \text{ and } X^t \subset \mathbb{R}_+^L,$$

where

$$\mathcal{U}(X^t) := \left\{ U \in \mathcal{U} : \operatorname{argmax}_{x \in \mathbb{R}_+^L} U(x, -p^t x) \in X^t \right\}.$$

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
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
Crucial observation:

By the Scaling Proposition, testing this model is the *same* as testing the McFadden-Richter model after suitable scaling of demand bundles.

# Observed Choices




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


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


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## Scaled Empirical Choice Probabilities



## Procedure for testing the random augmented utility model

1. Fix an arbitrary expenditure, say 1.
2. At each  $t$ , scale each observed choice  $x^t$  to  $\frac{x^t}{p^t x^t}$ .
3. This yields a distribution of choices on  $T$  budget planes.
4. Test stochastic GARP on these scaled empirical choice probabilities.

**Theorem 2:**  $\mathcal{D}$  can be rationalized by the random augmented utility model if and only if stochastic GARP holds on the scaled data set.

## Concluding Remarks

We develop a simple and intuitive model that allows for consistent welfare comparisons between prices.

This model is easily extendable into a random utility model

We implement the test of the random augmented utility model on UK household spending data:

- ▶ The model is not rejected.
- ▶ We estimate the proportion of consumers who are better/worse off between one observation and another.

These estimates are reasonably tight.